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Becker v. Federal Communications Commission
95 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
INTRODUCTION
Daniel Becker ("Becker") and the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Interested
in Viewers' Constitutional Rights ("WACCr) filed suit against the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") involving two sections of the Communications
Act of 1934 (the "AcV') 1 and challenged the FCC's interpretation of its powers under
the Act in denying Becker's access to prime time broadcasting slots for his political
commercials.2 Under § 312(a)(7) (1994), the Act requires broadcasters to provide
candidates for federal office with "reasonable access" to the broadcast media.3 Section
315(a) of the Act guarantees all candidates for elective office equal opportunities in
the use of the broadcast media, and deprives licensees of the power to censor the
material a candidate may wish to broadcast.
4
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the initial
Declaratory Ruling ("Ruling") of the FCC violated the "reasonable access"
requirement of § 312(a)(7) by permitting content-based channeling of non-indecent
political advertisements? In addition, the court of appeals found the FCC Ruling to be
violative of the "no censorship" and "equal opportunities" provisions of § 315(a),
because it permitted licensees to discriminate against candidates based on the content
of the message of the advertisement.6
FACTS
Becker, a candidate for election to the United States House of Representatives in
Georgia's Ninth Congressional District, requested the airing of a campaign
advertisement which included photographs of aborted fetuses.7 WAGA-TV, which
aired the commercial, received numerous complaints from viewers who saw the
advertisement"
Anticipating that Becker would request the commercial to be aired again, Gillett
Communications of Atlanta, the licensee of WAGA-TV, filed a petition with the FCC
requesting a declaratory ruling on the following question:
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal
Communications Commission and its regulatory powers and responsibilities.
2. Becker v. Federal Communications Commission, 95 F.3d 75, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 312(aX7) (1994).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994).
5. Becker, 95 F.3d at 75.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 76-77.
8. Id. at 77.
1
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whether a licensee may channel a use by a legally-qualified federal candidate to a safe
harbor9 when children are not generally.present in the audience if the licensee
determines in good faith that the proposed use is indecent or otherwise unsuitable for
children.'0
A petition followed from a number of unnamed broadcast licensees requesting a
declaratory ruling that broadcast licensees may decline to air political advertisements
that "present graphic depictions or descriptions of aborted fetuses or any other similar
graphic depictions of excised or bloody fetal tissue, where there is, in the good-faith
judgment of the licensee, a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.""
The FCC's Mass Media Bureau ("Bureau") found that the advertisement was not
indecent. 2 In addition, the Bureau stated that "such channeling would violate... §
312(a)(7) of the Act," because "channeling material that is not indecent... would
deprive federal candidates of their rights to determine how best to conduct their
campaigns."' 3 The petitioners filed an Application for Review. 4
In October 1992, Becker again sought to purchase air time from WAGA-TV. 5 He
desired to broadcast a 30-minute program entitled "Abortion in America: The Real
Story" on November 1 following an afternoon televised football game.'6 WAGA-TV
refused to air the program at the time requested, claiming that the advertisement would
violate the indecency provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.' The station was willing to
broadcast the program only during the safe harbor hours of midnight to 6 a.m.'
Becker filed a complaint with the FCC.'9
The FCC responded to Becker's request with a letter ruling. Noting that until the
FCC had solicited comments on the interplay of §§ 312(a)(7) and 315(a) and the
indecency provision of the criminal code, the letter stated that it would not be
unreasonable for the licensee to require the program to air during the safe harbor time
period as long as the licensee, in good faith, found the program to be indecent 2'
Becker then filed an Application for Review with the FCC.2
The FCC issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order on November 22, 1994,
denying Becker's Application for Review and granting the FCC's in part. The FCC
9. In other words, a time generally considered to have significantly fewer children viewers
(12 a.m. to 6 am.).Id. at 80. (citing Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654,665
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
10. Id. at 77. (citing Gillett Communications, Petition for Declaratory Ruling at 1 (July 28,
1992)).
11. Kaye Scholer, Petition for Declaratory Ruling at I (July 29, 1992).
12. LetterRuling, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599, 5600 (Aug. 21, 1992).
13. Id.







21. Letter Ruling, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (Oct. 30, 1992).
22. Becke, 95 F.3d at 78.
2
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concluded that Becker's initial advertisement was not indecent.' There was also
evidence in the record that the graphic political advertisements at issue can be
psychologically damaging to children.2" Furthermore, the FCC held that nothing in §
312(a)(7) precluded a broadcaster's exercise of some discretion with respect to
placement of political advertisements so as to protect children, and that channeling
would not violate the no-censorship provision of § 315(a).' As a result, WACCI and
Becker petitioned the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for review.26
LEGAL ANALYsis
The court's analysis focused on the statutory analysis and interpretation of §§
312(a)(7) and 315(a). Because Congress had not directly addressed the issue of
channeling by licensees of the broadcast media, the court sought to determine whether
the FCC's construction of the statute, in its guidelines, was rational and consistent with
the statute. If the guidelines met this requirement, the court must, according to the
Supreme Court in Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
defer to the guidelines.
I. SEcT oN 312(A)(7)
Section 312(a)(7) states that the FCC may revoke any station license for "willful or
repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable
amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate
for federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy."29 The appellate court noted,
however, that the Act did not define "reasonable access."3
The court referred to the FCC's policy guidelines to determine the meaning of the
phrase. In relevant part, "§ 312(a)(7) impose[s] upon licensees.., the specific
responsibility to afford... the opportunity to purchase reasonable amounts of time to
legally qualified candidates for Federal elective office; ... the test of whether a
licensee has fulfilled its obligations under § 312(a)(7) is one of reasonableness."3 In
addition, the guidelines state that "it is unreasonable and not in compliance with the
23. In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 312(aX7) of the
Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7649 (1994) ("Declaratory Ruling").
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Becker, 95 F.3d at 78.
27. Id.
28. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The Supreme Court held that unless Congress has
addressed a particular issue of the Act on point, a court must defer to the FCC's own
construction of the statute, provided it is "permissible," i.e., "rational and consistent with the
statute."
29. 47 U.S.C. § 312(aX7) (1994).
30. Becker, 95 F.3d at 78.
31. Licensee Responsibility under Amendments to the Communications Act Made by the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F.C.C. 2d 516, 516-517 (1974) (Licensee
Responsibility).
3
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statute for a licensee to adopt a rigid policy of refusing to sell or give prime-time
programming to legally qualified candidates."32 The guidelines further stite that such
a rigid policy would deny candidates access to time periods with the largest audiences
and would be inconsistent with congressional intent to give "candidates for public
office greater access to the media so that they may better explain their stand on the
issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters."33
The appellate court found the language in the guidelines to support the contention
that permitting a licensee to channel a political advertisement, which it believes may
be hanmful to children, frustrates Congress' primary purpose in enacting § 312(a)(7). 3
The court acknowledged, in passing, that there are competing interests between the
licensee's desire to protect children from offensive and harmful images and the interest
of a political candidate in having his statutory right of access to the largest audiences
on the airwaves.35 However, the court supported the notion that § 312(a)(7) was
designed to allow candidates the ability to gain access to the largest audiences, and that
giving licensees the power to make a subjective judgment in channeling programming,
albeit in good faith, would be akin to giving them free reign to make their
determinations.3"
The court supported its reasoning by citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 37 which stated that
"endowing licensees with a 'blank check' to determine what constitutes 'reasonable
access' would eviscerate § 312(a)(7). 38 In further support of its position, the court
noted that the FCC never has sufficiently outlined the circumstances under which a
licensee can reasonably refuse broadcast time to political candidates during certain
parts of the broadcast day.39 Although the FCC has stated that denial of access may
occur when there is a realistic danger of substantial program disruption,40 the factors
which the FCC advises the licensee to consider in protecting himself or herself bear
no connection to making a decision to channel political advertisements based on their
content.4
An additional concern of the court was that a subjective standard for the licensees
would render it impossible to determine whether it was the advertisement's message
rather than its images that the licensee found "too shocking for tender minds."42 The
court shared the petitioners' concern that it was impossible to separate certain
messages from graphic images, especially where a political candidate may wish to call
attention to an issue precisely because of the images involved.43 The court noted that
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Becker, 95 F.3d at 79-80.
35. Id. at 80.
36. Id. at 79-81.
37. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
38. Becker, 95 F.3d at 81.
39. Id. at 80.
40. Id.
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other volatile topics such as the death penalty, rape, gun control, euthanasia and
animal rights could evoke a similar shock effect.4
The court also found that certain provisions of the Act cited by the respondents did
not provide evidence of congressional concern for the quality of content of
advertisements during children's programs, but rather were concerned with regulating
the quantity and duration of advertisements.4" In addition, the court could not find any
sort of regulation for advertisements on broadcasting materials that are not indecent. 6
Because of the lack of evidence that Congress intended the good faith determinations
of licensees to supersede a political candidate's right to reasonable access to the
airwaves, the court held that §§ 312(a)(7) and 315(a) provided no right to licensee
discretion outside that specified as causing "a realistic danger of program
disruption."4
II. SacnON 315(A)
Section 315(a) provides that:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section .4S
The Supreme Court found that § 315(a) permits the "full and unrestricted discussion
of political issues by legally qualified candidates" and reflects Congress' "deep
hostility to censorship either by the Commission or by a licensee."49
In rejecting the respondents' alleged right to channel the content of certain political
advertisements, the appellate court stated that case law uniformly opposes allowing
licensees any power of censorship over the content of political broadcasts whether they
are "first" uses or responses to first uses.50 The court further found that the FCC's
guidelines provided no definition of "censorship" as it is applied in the statute."'
Relying on Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc.,52 the court
adopted the rationale that "censorship" encompasses more than the refusal to run a
candidate's advertisement or the deletion of material contained in it.53 Reasoning that




47. Id. at 80-82.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994).
49. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 528 (1959).
50. See, e.g., Hammondfor Governor Committee, 69 F.C.C. 2d 946,947 (Broadcast. Bur.
1978).
51. Becker, 95 F.3d at 82.
52. 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
53. Becker, 95 F.3d at 83.
5
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because erroneous decisions could not be corrected swiftly enough by the courts to
avoid injury to candidates during campaigns, the court concluded that censorship
would force a candidate to avoid controversial issues during a campaign and restrict
the coverage of consideration relevant to intelligent political decision.54 Problems of
self-censorship and discrimination between candidates, the court observed, frustrated
the full discussion of political issues that Congress intended.5"
The appellate court supported its view by citing case law which denied stations the
ability to require candidates to indemnify stations from liability due to a candidate's
advertisement, because such an agreement would limit the candidate's ability to
express his political ideas.5 6 Thus, it appears that "any attempts by a licensee to
coerce a candidate to revise his political announcement, albeit by threat of litigation
or otherwise, will be considered censorship."5"
The court further concluded that § 315(a) requires equal opportunities to
broadcasters' facilities The court reasoned that if a station channels one candidate's
message but allows his opponent to broadcast his messages in prime time, the first
candidate will have been denied equal opportunity guaranteed by § 315(a), and
subjected to "broadcasting Siberia."59
CONCLUSION
The court's interpretation of §§ 312(a)(7) and 315(a) is a clear and well-reasoned
argument against allowing licensees any power in making content-based decisions on
whether and whom to allow to make political advertisements.' Although the court
declined to discuss the influence of the First Amendment on this case directly, it is
clear that the court tacitly assumed congressional intent for the statutes to be consistent
with the notion of the First Amendment's protective stance against a "chilling effect"
on unpopular voices in the political arena.6"
LesleyA. Walter
54. Id. at 84.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 83-84. (citing Radio Station WPAM, 81 F.C.C. 2d 492 (1980) and D.J. Leary, 37
F.C.C. 2d 576 (1972)).
57. Becker, 95 F.3d at 83. (citing Radio Station WPAM, 81 F.C.C. 2d 492,495 (1980)
(emphasis added)).
58. Becker, 95 F.3d at 84.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 82.
61. Id. at 83-85.
6
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